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Abstract Improving the health and well-being of society is a priority to many
governments. One essential element within this debate focuses on the accessibility
and affordability of medicines for patients. Although interest in this area has
persisted for decades, the recent shift in this field is manifested by this now being
treated as a global concern, rather than as a regional or a national one. Patients in
both developed and developing countries alike are facing the same challenges and
are under an increased pressure to access and afford treatment. The recently
published UN High Level Panel for Access to Medicines Report explicitly stated
its view of ‘access to medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related health technolo-
gies as a serious, multidimensional global problem, with challenges that affect all
people and all countries.. . .the High-Level Panel recognizes that the costs of health
technologies are rising globally and are being felt by individuals and by public and
private insurance schemes in both wealthy and resource-constrained countries alike’
(UN Secretary General High Level Panel, ‘The United Nations Secretary-General
High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines Report: Promoting Innovation and Access
to Health Technologies’, (September 2016), 12. https://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/
documents/s23068en/s23068en.pdf.). This thinking represents a fundamental depar-
ture from the previous approach which classified the problem related to access to
medicines as one mainly attributed to developing and least developed nations. It is
within this debate that the role of intellectual property protection in general and by
way of the rise of TRIPS-Plus agreements and their impact on accessibility and
affordability of medicines takes centre stage.
The author would like to thank Professor Graham Dutfield for his valuable feedback and insights on
this chapter. The usual disclaimer applies.
M. El Said (*)
School of Justice, UCLAN, Preston, UK
e-mail: mel-said@uclan.ac.uk
© The Author(s) 2022




There are many factors which impacts the access to medicines debate. Government
policy, industrial development, demography, manufacturing capabilities, market
conditions and procurement and tax regimes are some factors. However, for some
time, the role of intellectual property monopolies especially patents granted to
innovator drug companies to protect their research and development (R&D) invest-
ments and provide market exclusivity by restricting competition became an integral
part of this debate.1 This chapter will look at various factors affecting the accessi-
bility and affordability debate and will focus on the role of intellectual property
protection in that process. It will provide useful examples of the positive impact
arising from the use of the TRIPS flexibilities and on the other hand will explain the
dangers affiliated with adopting TRIPS-Plus regimes in this regard. It will also
provide examples of practises and strategies which would limit the impact of
TRIPS-Plus commitments under national laws.
2 Expensive Medicines: National Implications and Global
Challenges
The price of medicines has been on a steady increase for some years. In the US,
prices for branded prescription drugs doubled in five years between the period of
2011–2016.2 Further, it was projected that the prices of medicines in the US will
increase on average 5.8% in 2020.3 More than 13% of Americans—about 34 million
people—say a friend or family member recently passed away in the last five years
after being unable to afford treatment for a condition while 58 million adults report
inability to pay for needed drugs in the past year, according to a new poll from
Gallup and West Health.4 A recent study in the UK found that total National Health
Service (NHS) spending on medicines in England has grown from £13 billion in
2010/11 to £17.4 billion in 2016/17—an average growth of around 5% a year. The
1It should be highlighted that there are also other regulatory regimes and intellectual property
exclusivities—apart from patents—aimed towards extending protection including those protecting
use of test data, various regulatory linkages, and also trademarks covering not just names but also
shapes and colours.
2MSF (2016). http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s23020en/s23020en.pdf.
3In 2019 more than 50 companies raised the prices on hundreds of drugs in the US by an average of
more than 6%, according to the analysis. Hopkins explains that the price of rheumatoid arthritis
treatment Humira, the world’s top-selling drug, was raised by 7.4%. Similarly, heparin products—
which are generic blood thinners typically administered in hospitals—prices rose by 15%. For more
see Hopkins (2020) <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/drug-prices-rise-58-on-average-in-
2020-2020-01-02>.
4Gallup and West Health (2019). https://news.gallup.com/poll/268094/millions-lost-someone-
couldn-afford-treatment.aspx?version¼print.
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same study concludes, ‘These figures are uncertain due to gaps in data, but the rate of
increase is substantially faster than for the total NHS budget over the same period’.5
With the prevalance of the COVID 19 pandamic, pressure on national health
providers have reached unprecedented levels.
The year 2019 was phenomenal in terms of setting new high records in medicines
prices. In March 2019, the United States Food and Drug Administration (USFDA)
approved the most expensive medicine in history up to date called Zolgensma
(priced at $2.125 million), a medicine used for a rare disorder that destroys a
baby’s muscle control and kills nearly all of those with the most common type of
the disease within a couple of years. Other more commonly used medicines’ prices
have also been notably high. For example, a 2018 WHO report on cancer medicines
concluded that ‘in the absence of insurance coverage, cancer treatment is
unaffordable for many patients. A course of standard treatment for early stage
HER2 positive breast cancer (doxorubicin, cyclophosphamide, docetaxel,
trastuzumab) would cost about 10 years of average annual wages in India and
South Africa and 1.7 years in the United States of America. The costs associated
with other medical care and interventions (such as surgical interventions and radio-
therapy) and supportive care (such as anti-emetics and haematopoietic growth
factors) would make overall care even more unaffordable. Even with insurance
coverage, patients living with cancer in many countries have reported financial
stress, to the extent that they may lower the treatment dose, partially fill prescriptions
or even forego treatment altogether’.6 In France, in December 2015, the Ligue contre
le cancer—which spends around €38 million ($43 million) a year on cancer research,
making it the largest French non-governmental funder of cancer R&D—condemned
cancer drug prices as ‘exorbitant, unfair and unbearable’ and warned that if
unabated, price inflation for new drugs posed a direct threat to the French medical
system7 while others have expressed that “economic considerations significantly
influence and, in some instances, take precedence over the scientific evidence” with
relation to French Guidelines on antiretroviral therapy treatment.8
Newly developed hepatitis C drugs’ prices have also raised eyebrows. The
efficient drug Sovaldi was launched at a list price of $84,000 for a standard
twelve-week treatment course, or about $1000 a pill. At the most recent average
net price of $45,000 per patient for all sofosbuvir-based products in the US, it would
cost $135 billion dollars to treat the estimated three million people with chronic
hepatitis C in the US—over one third of total annual spending on all prescription
drugs in the US.9 In the UK, the list price for a 12-week course of sofosbuvir was
5The King’s Fund (2018) https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018-04/Rising-cost-of-
medicines.pdf.
6WHO (2018), p. xi https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/277190/9789241515115-eng.
pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y.
7Sciences Avenir with AFP (2015). http://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/sante/cancer/20151216.
OBS1499/la-ligue-contre-le-cancer-denonce-les-prixexorbitants-des-medicaments-innovants.html.
8Raffi and Reynes (2014), p. 1158.
9I-MAK (2017).
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nearly £35,000 (excluding VAT) and double that for a 24-week course.10 Notwith-
standing the high price, in early 2015 sofosbuvir was recommended for funding
based on its cost effectiveness. However, because of the budget impact of the
treatment, in the following months the NHS England delayed consistent provision
of sofosbuvir, instead phasing introduction through the use of quotas and prioritising
patients with the most severe need.11 From 2012 to 2019, the average price of
AbbVie’s rheumatoid-arthritis drug Humira climbed from $19,000 a year to
$60,000 a year.12
The effects of this are felt in both developed and developing countries. Greater
number of patients are now unable to afford medicines while governmental health
budgets are struggling to cater for the needs of its citizens, a situation made worse
during the COVID 19 pandamic. Henceforth, patients in the developing countries
are lacking essential medicines and lifesaving treatments, diabetics have died in the
US due to high price of insulin while the Dutch government has had to suspend its
acquisition of the immune-oncology drug Keytruda (despite the fact that it helped in
its development) because it was too expensive.13 The NHS in the UK—a wealthy
country which, unlike the United States, has a publicly funded and all-inclusive
health service with considerable bargaining power—is having to ration the supply of
cancer drugs due to financial restrictions on treatment14 while waiting times for those
actually offered the treatment are far too lengthy.15
3 Unequal Investment and More Monopoly
The problem which high prices of medicines poses should not be viewed in isolation
of other contributing factors engulfing this debate. One issue which ranks high
within this context is the challenge of inadequate funding for diseases primarily
affecting the financially underprivileged or for which the opportunities to make large
and long-term profits are considered by the industry to be limited.
Growing criticism has been made regarding the deficiency of the global regime in
finding solutions to long standing diseases (or as some refer to as neglected
10Boseley (2015) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jan/16/sofosbuvir-hepatitis-c-drug-
nhs.
11Gornall et al. (2016), p. 4117.
12Entis (2019).
13The Economist (2019).
14Donnelly (2015). The article further identifies that in total, 17 cancer drugs for 25 different
indications will no longer be paid for in future in the UK.
15According to January 2019 NHS England data, almost 25% of cancer patients didn’t start
treatment on time despite an urgent referral by their primary care doctor. This represents the
worst performance since records began in 2009. For more see Pipes (2019). https://www.forbes.
com/sites/sallypipes/2019/04/01/britains-version-of-medicare-for-all-is-collapsing/
#4c6ebeb736b8.
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diseases) or the unequal distrbution of COVID 19 vaccines as an example. One
visible area of concern is that related to the development of new antibiotics, an issue
the WHO have classified as a global challenge in recent years. According to WHO,
“No major new class of antibiotics has been discovered since 1987 and too few
antibacterial agents are in development to meet the challenge of multidrug resis-
tance.”16 One of the main issues related to lack of investment and R&D in this field is
attributed to the industry’s fear that resistance to these drugs would develop even-
tually hence eliminate the usefulness of the drug rapidly which may explain why
most major pharmaceutical companies have stopped research in this area, a situation
that has been described as a “serious market failure” and “a particular cause for
concern”.17
In a recently published two reports, the WHO warned about the adverse effects of
the declining private investment and lack of innovation in the development of new
antibiotics. The WHO further highlighted how this is also undermining efforts to
combat drug-resistant infections and diseases. The WHO reports found that the
60 products currently in development (50 antibiotics and 10 biologics) bring little
benefit over existing treatments and very few target the most critical resistant
bacteria (Gram-negative bacteria).18 The Chairman of the UK Review on Antimi-
crobial Resistance warned recently that, if left unaddressed, drug-resistant infections
could be responsible for the deaths of some ten million people a year by 2050, and
$100 trillion in economic damage.19
Other neglected diseases also share similar challenges and evident lack of invest-
ment and innovation. For example, a 2002 analysis of new chemical entities
developed between 1975 and 1999 found that only 1.1% were actually treatments
devoted to tuberculosis (TB) and tropical diseases, despite them causing 11.4% of
the global disease burden.20 Although the years between 2000 and 2011 witnessed
some improvement whereby of the 850 new therapeutic products registered, 4.4%
were for neglected diseases.21 However, according to the same study, only 4 of the
336 new chemical entities brought to the market during the same period were for
neglected diseases (including malaria)—just 1.2% of the total.
16WHO (2015), p. 5 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/193736/1/9789241509763_eng.pdf.
However, it was announced in late 2019 that a new antibiotic for drug-resistant tuberculosis—
pretomanid was finally approved by the FDA. Interestingly, the drug was developed by the
non-profit TB Alliance rather than the industry. For more see Dearment (2019) https://
medcitynews.com/2019/08/new-antibiotic-for-drug-resistant-tuberculosis-scores-fda-approval/.
17Ibid, 11.
18The two WHO reports cited below also found that research and development for antibiotics is
primarily driven by small- or medium-sized enterprises with large pharmaceutical companies
continuing to exit the field. For more see WHO (2017) https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/
10665/258965/WHO-EMP-IAU-2017.11-eng.pdf?sequence¼1, and WHO (2019) https://apps.
who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/330290/WHO-EMP-IAU-2019.12-eng.pdf.
19O’Neill (2015).
20Trouiller et al. (2002), p. 2188.
21Pedrique et al. (2013), p. 371.
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TB which is the biggest infectious disease killer in the world today is another case
in point, whereby the death toll alone in 2014 was 1.5 million lives. Until very
recently, no new drug was introduced for nearly 50 years.22 Furthermore, the last
treatment—largely inadequate due to its side effects—developed for Chagas disease
(leading cause of infectious heart disease in Latin America) was over 40 years ago.
Ebola also placed the global treatment regime under security. Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) who often operates within the disease-stricken countries further
states that the ‘fact that MSF frontline health workers lacked a treatment or a vaccine
for Ebola virus as the outbreak engulfed Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia in 2014 is
a poignant illustration of this problem. But the problem of inadequate or non-existent
treatments and vaccines was a challenge for MSF long before 2014’.23 Notably, it
was only in late 2019, it was announced that a new vaccine was approved in the US
and EU for Ebola.24
4 The Double Taxation of Society
One of the strongest criticisms against pharmaceutical companies is the way they
engage in business activities and R&D operations. It is vital to acknowledge that
innovator pharmaceutical companies need incentives to protect their investments.
Yet to what extent that should be sought at the expense of public health policy
concerns is questionable. The high prices of medicines does not only have a negative
effect regarding accessibility, but have also attracted criticism due to the fact that a
vast number of medicine discoveries and some of the subsequent drug development,
or indeed much of it in some cases, was funded by tax payers. The situation is made
worse by anticompetitive behaviour of some of these companies.
It is no secret that the governmental levels of financial and technical support for
biomedical innovations are considerable. The public sector makes substantial con-
tributions to research and development upfront, through grants, subsidies and tax
credits. In fact, some studies suggest that 30% of the estimated $240 billion yearly
total global investment across all health R&D comes from the public sector.25
Several cases illustrate this, including Truvada. The drug was initially developed
and patented by the US government after the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) received $50 million in federal grants in addition to $7 million
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2015. However, the government did
not receive any income and no improvement in terms of accessibility rates was
observed (it is believed that less than 10 percent of the 1.1 million people who should
be on treatment are receiving it) despite the fact that Gilead Sciences the maker of the
22See MSF (2016).
23See MSF (2016), p. 8.
24For more see Herder et al. (2020), pp. 1–14.
25Røttingen et al. (2013), p. 1286, also see MSF (2016).
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drug earned $3 billion in sales in 2018 prompting the US government to initiate legal
action against Gilead.26
Moreover, a study found that during the past four decades, 153 new
FDA-approved drugs, vaccines, or new indications for existing drugs were discov-
ered through research carried out in public sector research institutions (PSRIs). It
was reported that these drugs included 93 small-molecule drugs, 36 biologic agents,
15 vaccines, 8 in vivo diagnostic materials, and 1 over-the-counter drug. More than
half of these drugs have been used in the treatment or prevention of cancer or
infectious diseases.27
Similar trends are observed elsewhere outside the US. In 2017, campaigners in
the UK claimed that the NHS spent more than £1 billion on drugs developed from
publicly funded research in 2016. A report published by campaign groups Global
Justice Now and Stop Aids claimed that UK tax payers and patients worldwide are
being denied the medicines they need, despite the public sector playing a pivotal role
in the discovery of new medicines. It concluded that ‘In many cases, the UK
taxpayer effectively pays twice for medicines: first through investing in R&D, and
then by paying high prices for the resulting medicine once ownership has been
transferred to a private company.’28 The report cites several examples of drugs
which received public funding but now are out of the reach of majority of patients.
For example, the report explains how Alemtuzumab was originally developed at
Cambridge University and first approved for the treatment of B-cell chronic lym-
phocytic leukaemia (B-CLL). Cambridge scientists then led further investigations of
its usefulness, at a smaller dosage, in treating multiple sclerosis (MS). Sanofi
Genzyme, who had acquired the rights to the drug, removed it from the market as
a B-CLL medicine and re-launched it as a medicine for MS. The Report verifies that
‘At the time of withdrawal there was speculation that the exercise was motivated by
commercial reasons. When it was used off-label (i.e. used for a non-licenced
purpose) for MS prior to being withdrawn from the market, the price in the UK
was around £2,500 per MS treatment course in 2012’. In 2017, it costs was £56,000
per treatment course—a 22-fold increase.29
On the other hand, several anticompetitive practises have had a far-reaching
impact on prices. Even when there are opportunities to reduce prices, we find that
this is not taken advantage of (and even intentionally delayed). A recent study found
that of the more than 1600 generic drugs approved by the FDA since January 2017,
more than 700—or 43 per cent—are not for sale in the US.30
26Rowland (2019).
27Stevens et al. (2011), p. 535.
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Delaying tactics have also incurred huge costs on society. One study estimates
that the American health system is poised to incur $55 billion during the next
15 years on three drugs (related cancer and hepatitis C treatment) alone due to
patents blocking and delaying the entry of generic competition on these drugs only.
Product lifecycle management, whereby branded companies obtain unmerited pat-
ents to delay competition,31 is the primary strategy identified and evaluated by this
study. The study also highlights that another related strategy is “pay-for-delay”
whereby branded companies pay generics to stay off the market for some time.32
5 More Pharmaceutical Patents, Weaker Innovation
An equally troubling development which has contributed to the increase in medi-
cines prices and extended monopoly patent terms in recent years is the increase in the
number of drug patents granted, particularly those ‘inventions’ which are of a low
and inferior quality, or as may be referred to as frivolous/trivial patents. This process
is leading to what is referred to as the ‘evergreening’ of drugs.33
This development may be explained by looking at some national statistics in this
regard. For example, it was found that between the years 2006 and 2016, the number
of drug patents granted in the US doubled. The granted patents were mainly
dedicated to accumulating patents not for new medicines but rather for small changes
to existing ones, which allows them to build and extend monopolies, block
31It should be noted that the product lifecycle management starts at the development and regulatory
approval stages and extends beyond the expiry of the granted patent. Notably, drug manufacturers
do not only rely on patent protection when devising their lifecycle strategies. For example, reliance
on trademark protection and branding is also vital in providing effective means to secure and
maintain a strong market position. For more on this see Dutfield (2020). file:///C:/Users/melsaid/
Downloads/Not_Just_Patents_and_Data_Exclusivity_Th.pdf.
32I-MAK identifies the following three multi-billion-dollar drugs as having questionable patents
that are providing excess exclusivity periods:
• Revlimid® (lenalidomide): Unmerited patents enable a minimum exclusivity period from 2019
through 2028. Payers are projected to spend $45 billion in excess costs for the drug within this
period, prior to the first generic product entering the market.
• Sovaldi® (sofosbuvir): Unmerited patents will prevent competition from now through 2034,
when final patents held by Gilead Sciences expire on the drug. Payers are projected to incur $10
billion in excess costs.
• Gleevec® (imatinib): In the one-year period from 2015–16, approximately $700 million dollars
in excess costs were passed onto payers as a result of a pay-for-delay deal cut by Novartis to a
generic company in exchange for delaying the entry of generic imatinib.
For more see I-MAK (2017).
33The majority of these patents focuses on developing so-called ‘me-too’ drugs—medicines which
have only small clinical advantages over existing drugs, but which can be patented and bring
substantial profits. The effects of evergreening vary but the primary impact would be to extend the
monopoly term granted to patents. For more see Kesselheim et al. (2006), p. 1637.
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competition and drive prices up.34 Moreover, on the 12 best-selling drugs in the US,
drug makers have filed an average of 125 patent applications and have been granted
an average of 71 patents for each.35 Another study found that 74 applications have
been filed on Lantus (it is a man-made form of a hormone (insulin) that is produced
in the body which works by lowering levels of glucose (sugar) in the blood) only in
the US, which have the potential to delay competition for 37 years.36 This kind of
“over patenting” blocks competition and enables pharmaceutical companies more
freedom to regulate the pricing market of medicines.37
Elsewhere the findings are similar. A study in Australia found an average of
49 secondary patents granted for each of the 15 highest-cost drugs over a 20-year
period. One-quarter of these secondary patents were believed to be evergreening
patents.38 The Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison at the Therapeutic Products
Directorate of Health Canada estimates that 44% of the 419 medicines on the Patent
Register are covered by more than one patent.39
Moreover, an EU investigation concluded in 2008 that out of the 219 molecules
in the sample under the investigation, originator and generic companies identified at
least 1300 patent-related out of court contacts and disputes concerning the launch of
generic products in the period 2000 to 2007. The vast majority of disputes were
initiated by the originator companies, which most often invoked their primary
patents, e.g. by sending warning letters. In this respect the inquiry finds that
individual medicines are protected by up to nearly 100 product-specific patent
families, which can lead to up to 1300 patents and/or pending patent applications
across the Member States. Despite the lower number of underlying patent families
based on European Patent Office (EPO) applications, looking from a commercial
perspective, ‘a challenger may, in the absence of a European Community patent,
need to analyse and possibly confront the sum of all existing patents and pending
patent applications in those Member States in which the generic company wishes to
enter’.40





37Amin and Kesselheim examined patents granted for two HIV drugs (ritonavir and lopinavir/
ritonavir) and found that Abbott owned 82 secondary patents and had a further 26 pending
applications in the US, all of which involved small variations on the original patents for these
drugs. They found that these evergreening patents could delay generic competition for 19 years
beyond the date from which generic entry would have been anticipated. For more see Amin and
Kesselheim (2012).
38Christie et al. (2013), p. e60812.
39Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison (2005).
40EU Commission (2008), p. 10. https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/
communication_en.pdf.
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Elsewhere, another analysis found of the 1015 new drugs and indications
approved in France between 2004 and 2013, only 6.3% offered a clear therapeutic
advantage, almost none were considered breakthroughs, and the majority (69.3%)
offered no clear therapeutic benefit or were prematurely approved even though their
clinical evaluation showed them to be more harmful than beneficial.41 A second
analysis found that 85 to 90% of new products approved over the last four decades
have provided only limited benefits.42 A third study that looked not just at registered
products, but specifically at new chemical entities and new biologics, found that the
majority of those launched in the UK between 2001 and 2012 were only “slightly
innovative” and only a quarter (26%) were believed to be “highly innovative”.43
Rather than using the patent regime as an incentive to innovate and recoup
investment for worthy inventions, ‘evergreening’ tactics and practises are in fact
blocking accessibility and weakening innovation capabilities by undermining the
true foundations of the patent regime and turning it into monopoly creator with no
positive contribution to society’s needs.44
6 Increased IP Standards: From TRIPS-Minus
to TRIPS-Plus
The global regulation of intellectual property rights is a relatively modern concept.
Prior to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1996, countries had
considerable policy space and full discretion in designing their national intellectual
property legal regimes in accordance with their development stage and national
priorities.45 As such, a large number of countries did not award legal protection to
patents related to drugs and pharmaceutical products.46
This was no longer the case with the creation of the WTO. The Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement)47
obligated member states to provide legal protection for inventions in all technolog-
ical fields including pharmaceutical products. This was an important development
whereby for the first time in history, countries lost the ability to regulate their
41Prescrire International (2005), pp. 68, 71.
42Light and Warburton (2016), p. 34.
43Ward et al. (2014), p. 6235.
44Drahos (2010).
45See generally Machlup and Penrose (1950), p. 1.
46See El Said (2010).
47See the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establish the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (listing the limitations on use of intellectual property by third
parties authorized by the government).
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national intellectual property regimes freely and in accordance with their national
development plans.
Reaching consensus regarding the TRIPS agreement was not a simple act. The
intellectual property negotiations during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations
were amongst the most contentious and complex. As such and in order to strike a
balance between the rights of users and intellectual property holders on the one hand,
and the society on the other, several ‘flexibilities’ were introduced within TRIPS in
order to curtail the negative impact which may arise from excessive intellectual
property protection and at the same time to enable countries to deal with their public
health challenges and emergencies.
6.1 The Flexibilities Explained
The TRIPS ‘flexibilities’ may best be explained as options available to member
states allowing them to comply with the TRIPS Agreement requirements and at the
same time maximise the implementation space available to them in accordance with
their priorities.48 Following are some examples of the health-related flexibilities
available under the agreement to member states:
– Transitional periods. According to the WTO, least developed countries (LDCs)
are given an extended transition period to protect intellectual property under the
WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. This is in recognition of their special requirements
and status, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and the need
for flexibility so that they can create a viable technological base. Several exten-
sions of the transition period were provided by the TRIPS Council. The last 6th of
November 2016 Council decision extends until January 2033 the period during
which key provisions of the WTO’s intellectual property agreement, the TRIPS
Agreement, do not apply to pharmaceutical products in LDCs.49 This means
LDCs can choose whether or not to protect pharmaceutical patents and clinical
trial data before 2033. The decision also keeps open the option for further
extensions beyond that date.50
48There is a general differentiation in the literature between expressly provided safeguards,
limitations/exceptions and countervailing legal principles and objectives on the one hand, and
vague terminology on the other hand where there are provisions and omissions whose scope is
subject to a wide range of interpretations in accordance with national and international legal
regimes. For more see El Said (2010).
49See the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country
Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision of the Council
for TRIPS of 6 November 2015.
50In 2019, Uganda notified the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO) that it
is exercising its right as a least-developed country by stating that pharmaceutical inventions are not
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– Compulsory licensing. A tool through which the state authorizes a third party to
exploit patented inventions, generally against a specified royalty paid to the
patent holder provided that several conditions set under the TRIPS Agreement
(Article 31) are complied with. The objective behind this is to curtail anti-
competitive behaviour and ensure the transfer of technology and dissemination
of knowledge.51
– Government use exceptions. A tool which grants the state the right to use the
patent without obtaining the consent of the patent holder for the purpose of public
interest, including public health necessities. Although government use conditions
are similar to compulsory licensing, government use exceptions provide an added
advantage by fast-tracking the process, through granting the government the right
to use the pharmaceutical patent without the need for prior negotiations with the
owner.
– Parallel importation. This tool gives the option to member states to obtain
patented products when they are lawfully available in a foreign market at a
lower price, thus enabling countries to shop for cheaper patented products. This
requires as a prerequisite that a country adopt an exhaustion regime suitable to its
needs and priorities.52
– Exceptions to patents rights. Article 30 of TRIPS provides that members “may
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”53 However, the
above provision does not define the scope of the permissible exceptions thus
awarding member countries some considerable discretion to operate. Examples of
these exceptions include the Bolar exception54 and the research and experimental
use exception.
– Standards of patentability. Under TRIPS, patent protection must be granted for
products and processes which are new, involve an inventive step and are indus-
trially applicable.55 However, each of these are not defined and can be interpreted
eligible for patent protection in the country. See ‘t Hoen (2019). https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/
2019/10/uganda-tells-aripo-no-more-patents-for-pharmaceuticals/.
51The special compulsory licensing system in the amended TRIPS Agreement, and the earlier 2003
waiver decision, (sometimes called the “Paragraph 6 System” because it refers to paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration) only deals with compulsory licences to produce medicines expressly for export
purposes.
52See TRIPS Agreement, Article 6.
53See TRIPS Agreement, Art. 30.
54This important exception facilitates the production and introduction of generic medicines into the
market on the date of patent expiry. Accordingly, this exception permits the use of an invention for
the purpose of obtaining approval of a generic product before the patent actually expires and
without having to obtain the patentee’s approval. The WTO ruled that the use of this exception is
TRIPS-compliant. For more see the WTO (2000).
55See TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.
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and applied by member states in accordance with their national priorities and
objectives. For example, TRIPS do not specify the patenting of new uses of
known products, including pharmaceutical drugs, thus allowing member coun-
tries the possibility of rejecting these new uses for lack of novelty, inventive step
or industrial applicability.
– Other procedural flexibilities. Another identified policy tool that may be used to
improve the quality of granted patents and limits “evergreening” is pre-grant and
post-grant patent oppositions, in addition to patent revocation proceedings. These
methods have been used at different times in a wide range of developed and
developing countries. Such proceedings enable interested parties to bring claims
before the patent office on the basis that a particular patent does not meet local
requirements.
6.2 Putting the Flexibilities into Use
We now have a considerable body of literature and empirical research dedicated to
the benefits of utilising the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities under national laws.
Despite this, some would still argue that the use ‘of the TRIPS flexibilities has been
sporadic and limited’56 and that more could still be achieved in this regard.57
A much widely affiliated issue with the use of the flexibilities is the issue related
to the impact of generic drugs entry into the market and the savings achieved as a
result. In many cases, this is enabled by the flexibilities effect in curtailing
‘evergreening’ and in opposing low quality patents. As such, it is common to see
medicine prices dropping substantially (ranging between 30–90 percent in some
cases) when generic medicines enter a market following the expiry of a patent.58
Compulsory licensing is the most used flexibility in this regard.59 There is no
scarcity of evidence with relation to the positive impact compulsory licensing has
had upon improving access to medicines. Malaysia was one of the latest countries to
issue a “government use” compulsory license to obtain much cheaper version of a
generic version of the famously known hepatitis C medicine Sofosbuvir in
September 2017. It is believed that compulsory license issuance have enabled
treatment cost at RM1000 to RM1200 ($240–$285) for 12 weeks course, compared
to RM300,000 (approx. $72,000) which was the cost of treatment with the patented
56‘t Hoen et al. (2018), pp. 185–193.
57For more see El Said (2014), p. 60.
58See El Said (2010).
59See number of compulsory licenses issued in ‘t Hoen et al. (2018), p. 188. However, it should be
kept in mind that the ability to use compulsory licensing is not an available option to all countries
equally but is rather more relevant to those which possess manufacturing capabilities.
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version and prior to issuance of the license.60 Moreover, it was reported that between
2013 and 2017, the Ecuadorian Institute of Intellectual Property (IEPI) issued ten
compulsory licences for various medications including antiretroviral drugs.61
According to health officials in Ecuador, the compulsory licenses granted between
2013 and 2014, generated the potential for savings of 23 per cent to 99 per cent.62
Similar findings may also be found in the case of other compulsory licenses issued
by Thailand, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Columbia.63
One of the other important flexibilities available to countries is related to the issue
of patentability standards. As highlighted, member countries have a wide discretion
and freedom to apply and define the patentability criteria of an invention under their
national regime. As such, India has applied a strict patentability criteria aimed
towards limiting the number of frivolous or secondary pharmaceutical patents
granted.64 Although we cannot measures the direct price impact this will have on
medicines nevertheless it is believed that the utilisation of this flexibility have a
substantial impact in preventing patent abuses and the granting of low quality patents
(anti-evergreening strategy).65 Other countries such as China and Philippines are
following a similar approach to the Indian one in this regard.66
Egypt provides an interesting case as well. The country is home to the highest rate
of HCV infections in the world. The Egyptian’s Patent Office practise won praise
couple of year ago when it rejected one of Sofosbuvir patent applications through its
application of a strict patentability criteria. This allowed a local generic producer to
produce the drug for less than $200 per 12-week treatment.67
60For more see Ling (2019). http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/using-compulsory-
licence-affordable-medicines-200558.
61The issued compulsory license were for three ARV medicines namely Ritonavir+Lopinavir and
Lamivudine+Abacavir, for Etoricoxib (Arcoxia® for the treatment of diseases with acute pains);
Mycophenolate Sodium (MYFORTIC) used in the treatment of reception of kidney transplants;
sunitinib, an anticancer drug used for the treatment of carcinoma renal cells (CRC) and gastroin-
testinal stromal tumours (GISTs); and finally Certolizumab, used to counteract rheumatoid arthritis.




63For more see El Said (2016), p. 374.
64See Chatterjee (2013). https://www.ip-watch.org/2013/04/01/novartis-loses-patent-bid-lessons-
from-indias-3d-experience/.
65See Sampat and Shadlen (2017), p. 693.
66Other countries are increasingly following India’s patentability path. The Philippines patent law,
as amended in 2008, introduced a section similar to the Indian 3(d) section (although less stringent
than India’s Patent Act).177
China has reformed its Patent Act in 2008 and 178. See Patent Law (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, rev’d Dec. 27, 2008), art. 22. For more
see El Said (2016).
67Velasquez (2019), p. 108.
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Parallel importation is another flexibility already used by several countries with
positive results. For example, six African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius,
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) have incorporated an international exhaus-
tion regime in their laws, allowing parallel imports from anywhere in the world.
More specifically, Kenya has actively and effectively used parallel importation to
improve access to antiretroviral medications.68
Opposition procedures have been applied usefully and efficiently in several
countries. This issue is posed to gain more importance due to the increased volume
of pharmaceutical patents granted worldwide. To give a glimpse, it is believed that
current estimates suggests that at least 27% of current patents would be found invalid
by US courts due to low quality.69
There are many more examples of the use of the flexibilities by both developed
and developing countries which this chapter will not delve into. However, a number
of observations could be made about the efficient and successful use and implemen-
tation of these flexibilities under national regimes. First, the need for a proactive
national legislature is fundamental for the success of this process. Although these
flexibilities are available under the international intellectual property regime, their
implementation would not take place directly without legislating—in details—them
under national laws and regulations. Second, awareness about the existence of these
flexibilities is vital for their utilisation. Thirdly, the need for an engaged public,
national entities and active civil society is essential for the success of this process as
demonstrated by many thus far. Lastly, independent and highly trained judiciary is
vital in the process of implementation and interpretation of these flexibilities under
national legal frameworks.
6.3 The Shift Towards TRIPS-Plus
The TRIPS Agreement was subsequently used as a platform for further regulation of
intellectual property rights globally. Although the initial understanding of develop-
ing countries was that TRIPS would put an end to unilateralism and coercion in the
regulation and enforcement of intellectual property by developed countries particu-
larly the United States, that vision turned out to be misguided. Within a short period
of time following the creation of the TRIPS Agreement, a new generation of bilateral
and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) started to emerge, with a far-reaching
WTO-Plus agenda.
With relation to intellectual property, FTAs often contained dedicated chapters
incorporating extensive intellectual property provisions which often include TRIPS-
Plus obligations going beyond those required by the TRIPS Agreement. These
68UNAIDS (2011), p. 15. https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2260_DOHA
%2B10TRIPS_en_0.pdf.
69Miller (2012). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2029263.
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TRIPS-Plus obligations restricted the available policy space of member states and
gradually eliminated the options and flexibilities available to them under the TRIPS
Agreement.70 Although the full impact of these TRIPS-Plus agreements is yet to
materialise, we already have a considerable and rather frightening understanding—
as will be explained in the next part of this chapter—about the negative impact these
agreements have on affordability and accessibility to medicines.
6.4 Impact and Examples of TRIPS-Plus Obligations
Before looking into the negative impact of TRIPS-Plus, it would be helpful to
understand how do FTAs increase intellectual property protection levels beyond
the TRIPS standards? An important objective of TRIPS-Plus obligations is to limit
the use of the flexibilities available under the international intellectual property
regime thus making it more difficult to utilise such flexibilities. There are a number
of areas where this may take place with relevance to patents and public health. These
include the following examples:
– Expanding the scope of pharmaceutical patents and creating new drug
monopolies: this is achieved through a number of ways such as:
• lowering the patentability standards,
• requiring patents be available for surgical and treatment methods,
• minor variations on old medicines, new and second uses, and71
• Further extension of protection to biological products which include vaccines,
blood and blood components, and gene therapies in addition to other forms of
protection.
– Extension of monopolies by extending patent terms if review at the patent office
or regulatory authority failed completion within a certain period of time.
– Risk facilitating patent abuse by requiring countries to condition marketing
approval on patent status (patent linkage).
– Protection and Extension of “data exclusivity”: by providing at least 5 years
exclusivity for information related to new products and 3 more in cases of new
uses for old medicines—even when that information is disclosed and available in
the public domain. More recent FTAs have also provided 10 years of “effective
market protection” for biologics.72
– Prohibition/restriction pre-grant oppositions—forbid challenges to weak or
invalid patents until after they have been granted.
70See Drahos (2001), p. 791 and El Said (2005), pp. 53–66.
71For more on this from an EU perspective please see Dutfield (2017), p. 453.
72Ney (2019). https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/contributor/joshua-ney/2019/08/exclusivity-
for-biologic-products-under-the-usmca-what-is-changing-and-what-happens-next.
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– Regulate the decisions to reimburse new drugs: this gives drug companies new
rights to challenge decisions on reimbursements if not favourable as currently
proposed under the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
– Require new forms of intellectual property enforcement–grant: customs
authorities detaining shipments, including in-transit shipments, suspected of
non-criminal trademark/copyright/patent infringements; require mandatory injunc-
tions for alleged intellectual property infringements; raise damages amounts, etc.
– Introducing Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) procedures: this leads
to bypassing the WTO’s multilateral dispute settlement procedure and opting for
a more pro-investment one. This development has been highly controversial as
this grant private investors considerable power, especially big multinational
corporations, to claim high amounts of money of compensation from investor
sympathetic tribunals. Indirectly, this questions the impact of these claims on
states’ power to regulate in the public interest, in order to safeguard public
health priorities. Other flaws of the ISDS system include the lack of consistency
in decision making and the huge costs incurred. There is now growing evidence
that the threat of using these ISDS procedure is enough to obligate countries to
change their policies.73
The undisputed recommendation in this regard from a public health perspective
remains that countries should avoid entering into arrangements which obligates them to
apply TRIPS-Plus standards under national law. As states by UNDP and UNAIDS:74
Countries at minimum should avoid entering into FTAs that contain TRIPS-plus obligations
that can impact on pharmaceuticals price or availability. Where countries have undertaken
TRIPS-plus commitments, all efforts should be made to mitigate the negative impact of these
commitments on access to treatment by using to the fullest extent possible, remaining public
health related flexibilities available.
The thus far realised impact of TRIPS-Plus obligations on public health and
access to medicines is frightening upon both developed and developing nations.75 In
one of the first studies ever conducted on the impact of TRIPS-Plus obligations, a
2007 Oxfam study on the effect of the US-Jordan FTA found that since 2001 (which
is the year the FTA was signed with the US), the prices of medicines in Jordan have
increased by 20% (this led to price increases between two and ten-fold for key
medicines to treat cardiovascular disease and cancer), and data protection provisions
has resulted in delaying generic drugs entry for 79% of medicines newly launched
between the years 2002 and 2006.76 The study estimates that the availability of
73For instance, in 2016; and Ukraine de-registered a generic hepatitis C medicine after Gilead
indicated that it would pursue arbitration. For more see Gleeson et al. (2019), p. 78.
74UNDP and UNAIDS (2012) https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/JC2349_
Issue_Brief_Free-TradeAgreements_en_0.pdf.
75See El Said (2010).
76Oxfam (2007), p. 5 https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/114080/
b p 1 0 2 - a l l - c o s t s - n o - b e n e fi t s - t r i p s - 2 1 0 3 0 7 - e n . p d f % 3 B j s e s s i o n i d %
3D089750820CF675173F0C3204C369D63F%3Fsequence%3D1. Also see El Said (2006), p. 501.
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generic equivalents would have reduced Jordan’s expenditure on medicines by $6.3
and $22 million between mid-2002 and 2006.77 The study also shows that no real
know-how transfer has occurred in the country despite the rhetoric that FTAs would
in fact encourage the flow of know-how and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Although the 2007 Oxfam study was conducted under less than 5 years of the
FTA implementation, we came a long way since then in terms of assessing and
understanding the impact of FTAs on accessibility and affordability of medicines.
More and more studies are affirming and exposing the negative impact of these
obligations on public health and access to medicines.
Amin and Keselheim conducted a study on the impact of ‘evergreening’ resulting
from the granting of secondary patents. The authors concluded that secondary
patents could extend market exclusivity and thus delay generic competition from
entering the market for many years. The study identified 108 patents related to two
HIV medicines (ritonavir (Norvir) and lopinavir/ritonavir (Kaletra)) which impact
could delay generic competition until at least 2028. This is a twelve years additional
period after the expiration of the patents on the drugs’ base compounds and thirty-
nine years after the first patents on ritonavir were filed.78
For instance, research by Lexchin concluded that extension of legal protection in
data protection for biologics have resulted in increase in spending in drug expendi-
ture in Canada. He estimated the lost savings from data protection extension to range
from $0 to $305.8 million.79 Another study in Australia found:80
At the time that the EOT [extension of the term] was introduced, the annual cost to the
Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS) was estimated to grow from $6 million in 2001-02 to
$160 million in 2005-06. This cost arises because there is a delayed entry to the PBS of
cheaper generic drugs. The estimate for 2012-13 is around $240 million in the medium term
and, in today’s dollars, around $480 million in the longer term. The total cost of the EOT to
Australia is actually about 20 per cent more than this, because the PBS is only one source of
revenue for the industry.
Another study conducted by the Australian Generic Medicines Industry Associ-
ation analysed the costs to the health system for 39 PBS-listed medicines for which
generic competition was delayed after the patent on the active pharmaceutical
ingredient expired, as a result of secondary patenting found that in the 12 months
to November 2012, the cost of delayed generic launch was calculated at $37.8–$48.4
million.81 This estimate does not include subsequent price reductions due to price
77Oxfam, Ibid.
78See Amin and Kesselheim (2012).
79Lexchin (2019), p. 10.
80Harris et al. (2013), p. vi https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/sites/default/files/2013-05-27_ppr_
final_report.pdf?acsf_files_redirect. The Report found that about 58% of new molecules listed on
the PBS from 2003 to 2010 received extensions of term. Of the term extensions granted since 1999,
47% received the full 5 years.18 The cost of these extensions to the PBS in 2012–13 was estimated
at about $240 million in the medium term and about $480 million in the longer term.
81Gleeson et al. (2015), p. 306.
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disclosure. Another study estimated the costs of patent extensions to the PBS in
2012–13 at about $240 million in the medium term and about $480 million in the
longer term.82 It was also found that data protection had no impact on the levels of
pharmaceutical investment in the country as highlighted with the case of the US FTA
with Jordan.
There has been much more work conducted recently in terms of alerting to the
negative impact of the highly controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPPA) agreement in this regard.83 The TPPA which is widely promoted as a
“model for 21st century trade agreements” is a comprehensive trade and investment
deal covering many areas including trade, investment, labour and intellectual prop-
erty rights in in addition to its investor-state dispute settlement procedure.84 Brook
concludes that ‘Provisions in the Intellectual Property (IP) Chapter of TPP lengthen,
broaden, and strengthen patent-related monopolies on medicine and erect new
monopoly protections on regulatory data as well. IP Chapter enforcement provisions
also mandate injunctions preventing medicines sales, increase damage awards, and
expand confiscation of medicines at the border’.85
In comparing the TPPA with similar agreements, a study found that the US-
Mexico-Canada Agreement’s (USMCA) intellectual property chapter is closely
based on the corresponding chapter of the TPPA, but includes 10 years of “effective
market protection” for biologics in addition to including a broader definition of
biologics, potentially expanding the array of drugs which will be eligible for this
longer period of exclusivity, longer than the period negotiated in the TPPA.86 For
Canada, this will increase the period of market protection for biologics by 2 years;
two studies of the potential impact on pharmaceutical expenditure (using different
methods and based on different assumptions) have estimated the savings foregone at
between CDN$0 and $305.8 and up to CDN$169 by 2029.87
7 What Could Be Done and What Is Done?
As explained, we have a considerable wealth of empirical research about the positive
impact of TRIPS flexibilities use and the negative impact of TRIPS-Plus obligations
on the health care and access to medicines regimes in several developed and
developing countries. However, it has been more difficult to observe how countries
82Harris et al. (2013).
83The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) issued a letter in 2019 to signatories of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that the United States has formally withdrawn from the
agreement.
84The TPP is the first trade agreement to include provisions on pharmaceuticals that are, or contain,
biologics, compounds produced through biological processes and which are used primarily for
treating cancer and immune conditions.
85Baker (2016), p. e1001970.
86Swanson (2019). https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/us/politics/nafta-drug-prices.html.
87Gleeson et al. (2015).
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with TRIPS-Plus regimes have in fact attempted to utilise the remaining policy space
available to them in order to mitigate the negative impact these TRIPS-Plus rules
have on their national health care regimes. This is so primarily due to the difficulty in
observing national practises and the lack of international jurisprudence arising from
disputes about the implementation of these obligations (or rather about if such an
implementation was in line with international norms or otherwise) under national
frameworks.
In addition, it should be realised from the outset that the effect of TRIPS-Plus
commitments will vary from each country and will depend on many factors,
including market side, pharmaceutical protection capacity, development of legal
regime, judiciary and so forth.
Nevertheless, and despite the above-mentioned difficulties, by looking into
several cases, we have been able to observe some important contributions in this
regard. The important aspect in this case is to continue applying and implementing a
nationally creative thinking and interpretive policy aimed towards limiting the
negative impact of the committed TRIPS-Plus rules. Following are examples of a
number of national experiences of how countries attempted to limit the negative
impact arising from TRIPS-Plus obligations.
7.1 Australia
One of the countries which have taken several serious steps in this field is Australia.
This is because the country has agreed to a TRIPS-Plus obligations regime arising
from the US-Australia FTA88 which had a huge cost on the national health budget
and the accessibility and affordability of medicines. Accordingly, in 2013,89 the
Australian legislator (following national consultation) introduced a number of
reforms aimed towards mitigating the effects of the ‘evergreening’ of patents starting
with applying a stricter patentability criteria by removing any geographical limita-
tion upon the common general knowledge and by removing the requirement for a
prior art document to be “ascertained”.90 The effect of this is to require a higher and
more consistent inventive step standard for Australian patents granted in the country.
Another area tackled by the Australian legislator is the issue of patent term
extension granted in order to compensate for the delays during marketing approval
as dictated under the FTA with the US.91 To start with, the 2013 Patent Law reform
88The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement (US-AUS FTA) signed in 2004.
89Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 No. 35, 2012 as amended.
Start date15 April 2013, hereafter the 2013 Patent Law.
90Dixon (2017).
91See US-AUS FTA, Art.17.9.8(b) states:
[E]ach Party shall make available an adjustment of the patent term to compensate the patent
owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of the marketing
approval process.
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attempted to limit the possibilities of allowing patent term extension by further
confining such type of extensions to certain and specific categories of products
related to patents claiming new active ingredients or formulations only.92
Moreover, the Australian 2013 Patent Law reform imposes additional substantive
conditions specifically applicable for the extension of patent duration for “pharma-
ceutical substances.” Based on this, the extension of the term is possible only if
either or both of the following conditions are satisfied:93
(a) one or more pharmaceutical substances per se must in substance be disclosed in
the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the scope of
the claim or claims of that specification;
(b) one or more pharmaceutical substances when produced by a process that
involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, must in substance be
disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within
the scope of the claim or claims of that specification.
In addition, both of the following conditions must be satisfied in relation to at
least one of those pharmaceutical substances:
(a) goods containing, or consisting of, the substance must be included in the
Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods;
(b) the period beginning on the date of the patent and ending on the first regulatory
approval date for the substance must be at least 5 years.
(4) The term of the patent must not have been previously extended under this Part.
Meaning of first regulatory approval date.
More reforms were introduced with relation to opposition procedures as well. As
such, detailed and expansive opposition grounds against patent term extension
procedures were included under the 2013 Patent Law reform. Accordingly, Article
78 of the Patent Law states:
If the Commissioner grants an extension of the term of a standard patent, the
exclusive rights of the patentee during the term of the extension are not infringed:
(a) by a person exploiting:
(i) a pharmaceutical substance per se that is in substance disclosed in the
complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within the scope
of the claim or claims of that specification; or
(ii) a pharmaceutical substance when produced by a process that involves the
use of recombinant DNA technology, that is in substance disclosed in the
complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within the scope
92See El Said (2016).
93See Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch 6 pt 3 s 70 sub-divs (2)-(3) (Austl).
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of the claim or claims of that specification; for a purpose other than
therapeutic use; or
(b) by a person exploiting any form of the invention other than:
(i) a pharmaceutical substance per se that is in substance disclosed in the
complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within the scope
of the claim or claims of that specification; or
(ii) a pharmaceutical substance when produced by a process that involves the
use of recombinant DNA technology, that is in substance disclosed in the
complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within the scope
of the claim or claims of that specification.
Patent linkage is another TRIPS-Plus issue whereby Australia’s approach may
provide some valuable lessons for others. Article 17.10.4 (in the Intellectual Property
chapter) of the US-AUS FTA provides for an attenuated or ‘weak’ form of patent
linkage with relation to two aspects as explained by Son et al:94
(a) measures in the marketing approval process to prevent a third party from
marketing a product during the term of a patent without the consent of the patent
owner; and
(b) no provision for the owner to be notified of a marketing approval request made
during the term of a patent. This wording provided scope for Australia to
implement a patent linkage mechanism in a very different way to the United
States.
In addition, the Australian regime excludes from protection patents covering
(1) the drug substance, (2) the drug product including composition and formulation,
and (3) the approved use from the patent linkage mechanism.95 Penalties for
providing false or misleading information, however, are disproportionately higher
for a patent holder certificate than for a generic producer certificate. Moreover,
Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS) imposes automatic and irrevers-
ible price cuts on medicines as soon as competing versions enter the market, this
often incentivise generic companies to launch faster at risk, and innovator companies
must pursue preliminary injunctions in order to resolve patent disputes.96 At the
same time, since 2012, Australia’s Department of Health has pursued market-sized
pecuniary damages (on top of those sought by the generic company) aimed at
compensating for a delay in the PBS price reduction that would have been applied
to a patented medicine during the period of a provisional enforcement measure.97
However, there is no corresponding mechanism for the government to compensate
94Son et al. (2018), p. 101.
95Son et al. (2018), p. 101.
96GIPC (2019). https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GIPC-Linkage-
Zoom-In-Report.pdf.
97Australian Government Department of Health (2016). http://www.pbs.gov.au/industry/pricing/
price-disclosure-spd/price-disclosure-operational-guidelines-06-2016.pdf.
318 M. El Said
innovators for the aforementioned losses if an infringing product is launched
prematurely.98
Although such reforms are vital, they should not be viewed as the only solutions
to the accessibility of medicines challange and therefore the intellectual property
regime should be viewed as one of several components and government strategies—
one element of an eco-system—in this regard which would improve accessibility and
affordability of medicines. For an example, in February 2019, the Australian gov-
ernment signed a five-year deal with pharmaceutical companies, involving a lump
sum payment of about $ 766 million for an unlimited five-year supply of the most
advanced Hepatitis C (HCV) drugs.99 This innovative approach which has been
called the “subscription” or “Netflix” model, have reduced the per-patient costs of
these cutting-edge treatments by roughly 85% in the country.100
7.2 Chile
Chile also proved an interesting case of a developing country which adopted a
TRIPS-Plus regime as a result of signing an FTA with the US in 2006 (the
US-Chile FTA). Following a rigorous national debate with relation to the negative
effect of data exclusivity and patent linkage included under the FTA, the Chilean
government amended the patent law by limiting the availability of data protection
under its national law to those pharmaceutical products that have been marketed in
the national territory in the year after the grant of marketing approval and therefore if
the drug was not marketed within a year, the test data submitted for approval
purposes will not be protected.101 The rationale behind such a requirement is to
encourage early registration of drugs after first registration abroad, so that the period
of protection for the pharmaceutical test data starts early.
In addition, the law excluded several elements from the scope of protection.
Accordingly, article 91 of the Chilean law states:
The protection of this Paragraph shall not apply when:
98GIPC (2019).
99The government also announced an investment of more than 1 Billion USD to enable universal
access to HVC treatment. See Velásquez (2017). https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/
2017/05/RP77_Access-to-Hepatitis-C-Treatment-A-Global-Problem_EN-2.pdf.
100Moon and Erickson (2019), p. 607. Furthermore, the State of Louisiana announced in January
2019 that it was pursuing a similar approach for HCV. For more see Crisp (2019) https://www.
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/article_614e4f42-1523-11e9-8c90-4fcb305d17e8.
html.
101Law No. 19,039 art. 90, September 30, 1991 (modified on December 1, 2005 by Law 19,996,
which classifies active ingredients as new chemical entities if they have not been marketed in the
country prior to the health registration or authorization application). See also Biadgleng and Maur
(2011), p. 20.
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(a) The owner of the test data referred to in Article 89 has engaged in forms of
conduct or practices declared as contrary to free competition in direct relation to
the use or exploitation of that information, according to the final decision of the
free competition court.
(b) For reasons of public health, national security, non-commercial public use,
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency declared by the
competent authority, ending the protection referred to in Article 89 shall be
justified.
(c) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product is the subject of a compul-
sory license, according to what is established in this Law.
(d) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has not been marketed in
the national territory after 12 months from the health certificate or clearance
granted in Chile.
(e) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has a health certificate
Furthermore, Chile implemented the linkage obligation established by the
US-Chile FTA through the provision of information to the patent owner about a
third party intending to commercialize a product with similar characteristics to one
that is already patented.102
The aim of these measures is to explore whatever policy space remains available
to the country in order to restrict the application of data exclusivity.
7.3 What Others Are Doing and How They Are Doing It?
There are many examples of interpretations and flexibility use taking place regularly
in different parts of the globe.103 These developments are either legislative, admin-
istrative or judicial in nature. Calls are made for countries to take advantage of the
remaining policy space in this regard and share their experiences with others.
Following are some non-exhaustive recommendations.
Several recommendations were made more with connection to data exclusivity
obligations. As a result, it is advisable for those regimes’ committing to TRIPS-Plus
data exclusivity provisions not to grant protection unless a specific application is
made (within a specific period—no more than 6 months—of time after the first
approval in the world of a medicine) and where certain conditions are met. Countries
102Correa remarks that on September 2nd, 2002 the Quinta Sala from the I Corte de Apelaciones
(I Court of Appeals, Fifth Chamber) of Chile ruled that the Instituto de Salud Publica, which issues
sanitary registries, ‘had no power whatsoever to either deny a marketing approval or to acknowl-
edge rights derived from a patent’. See Correa (2017). https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/RP74_Mitigating-the-Regulatory-Constraints-Imposed-by-Intellectual-Property-
Rules-under-Free-Trade-Agreements_EN-1.pdf. See also Chandler (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1602883.
103See Correa (2017).
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may also charge for these applications and require annual maintenance fee (such as
those applicable to trademarks). In addition, detailing when protection will terminate
is recommended. Correa suggests the following situations as examples:104
– When the right-holder or a person authorised by him does not commercialise the
approved product in a manner sufficient to supply the demand within a period
(e.g. twelve months) from the date of approval for commercialisation or when the
commercialisation is interrupted, for more than x consecutive months (e.g. six
months), except in cases of force majeure or government’s acts that prevent such
commercialisation.
– For public interest reasons such as national security, emergency or circumstances
of extreme urgency that justify the termination of the period of exclusivity.
– When, as a result of administrative or judicial procedures, it is determined that the
right-holder has abused his rights, for example, through practices declared as
anticompetitive.
Keeping health out of the FTA agenda is one right step in this regard. We can
observe some positive steps taken in this area. The recently concluded FTA between
Australia and Peru have explicitly excluded public health measures and/or specific
health programs from its scope. Article 8. 16 of the FTA states:105
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.
Compulsory licensing in TRIPS agreements is stated with ambiguous wording
such as ‘national emergency’, ‘other circumstances of extreme urgency’, and ‘public
non-commercial use’. To deal with this ambiguity, active interpretations of these
terms should be persued. In this context, the Thai experience is noteworthy. The
legislator there defined public non-commercial use as ‘nutrition and public health
service’ and ‘protection of natural resources and environment’. Also, the
legislater interpreted the non-use of a patent as ‘insufficient use of a patent due to
the high price’ and ‘severe shortage of food and drugs’.106
It is worth noting that the above referred to examples should not emanate from
separate national initiatives but rather as a part of a more comprehensive approach
dealing with public health challenges within these countries. As seen, several
developed countries acknowledge today the negative consequences to TRIPS-Plus
rules on public health and have taken steps to rectify the situation. Developing
countries should follow suit and take serious notice of such implications.
104Correa (2017).
105See the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Chapter 8: Invest-
ment. Peru-Australia Free Trade Agreement. https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/
pafta/Pages/peru-australia-fta.aspx.
106Kuanpoth (2006), p. 149.
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8 Final Thoughts
The world is at a crossroads. At the time of completion of this chapter, the world was
struggling in confronting the outbreak pandemic of the Corona virus (Covid-19).
Although several vaccines are available today, the daily loss of life is having grave
ramifications for the global economic and public health regimes. These outbreaks are
not new, however how we deal with them will depend on our ability to access and
grant funding for those working around the clock to find a cure. The intellectual
property regime needs reorientation to become truly an incentive rather than an
impediment to accessibility and treatment.
Some final thoughts could be made here with relation to supressing the impact of
TRIPS-Plus conditions on access to medicines within the framework of trade and
investment agreements. First, comprehensive assessment of the health impact of
FTAs and TRIPS-Plus commitments should be undertaken by policy makers and
negotiators. This should take place before an agreement is entered into. Second,
public and stakeholder engagement and collaboration is needed and should be a
priority. A national intellectual property committee with authorities and mandates
should be tasked with implementing a balanced national intellectual property
Agenda. Alternative and new business models for research and development are
needed to achieve better pricing of medicines. Push, pull and pooling strategies
should be given more thought and experimented with in this regard.107 Finally,
transparency in drug pricing is pivotal to ensure that (i fair compensation is granted
to those who invest in finding medical solutions to diseases, and (ii affordable drug
prices are applied so that patients can afford them. The 2019 World Health
Assembly’s resolution supporting greater public disclosure of prices for medicines
and other health products is a step in the right direction.108
The legal recommendation stands today the same as before; governments should
resist accepting and introducing TRIPS-Plus obligations even if others do so. At the
same time, those who committed to such obligations should undertake a thorough
review in order to identify areas where they can still utilise the TRIPS Flexibilities.
We may not be able to stop the spread of TRIPS-Plus commitments around the
globe; however, we should try and do our best to slow down the process of eroding
the remaining policy space.
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